Golden Gate University Law Review
Volume 10
Issue 1 Ninth Circuit Survey

Article 5

January 1980

The Ninth Circuit: No Place For Drug Offenders
Bill Ong Hing

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Immigration Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Bill Ong Hing, The Ninth Circuit: No Place For Drug Offenders, 10 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. (1980).
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol10/iss1/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Golden Gate University Law Review by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
jfischer@ggu.edu.

Hing: No Place For Drug Offenders

THE NINTH CIRCUIT: NO PLACE
FOR DRUG OFFENDERS
Bill Ong Hing*
In two troubling cases, the Ninth Circuit has ruled that relief
from deportation under section 212(c) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (the Act), I is unavailable to lawful permanent
resident alien drug offenders. The effect of the rulings in Nicholas
v. Immigration & Naturalization Service! and Rowe v. Immigration & Naturalization Services is to foreclose any relief in deportation hearings to longtime resident aliens who are convicted of
drug-related crimes and are deportable under section 241(a)(11)
of the Act. 4 This development places the Ninth Circuit in direct
• Assistant Professor of Law, Golden Gate University; J.D., University of San Francisco, 1974; LL.M. (candidate) Boait Hall; Former Director, Immigration Law Unit, San
Francisco Neighborhood Legal Assistance Foundation; Staff Advisory Group, Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy.
1. Section 212(c) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1976), provides:
Aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence who
temporarily proceeded abroad voluntarily and not under an
order of deportation, and who are returning to a lawful unrelinquished domicile of seven consectutive years, may be admitted
in the discretion of the Attorney General without regard to the
provisions of paragraphs (1) to (25), (30) and (31) of subsection
(a) . . . .

2. 590 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. Feb., 1979) (per Takasugi, D.J., sitting by designation; the
other panel members were Hufstedler and Tang, JJ.).
3. 597 F .2d 1158 (9th Cir. Feb., 1979) (per Choy, J.; Bright, J., sitting by designation,
filed a separate dissenting opinion; the other panel member was Carter, J.).
4. Section 241(a)(11) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (a)(l1) (1976), provides:
Any alien in the United States. . . shall. . . be deported
who-(11) is, or hereafter at any time after entry has been, a
narcotic drug addict, or who at any time has been convicted of
a violation of, or a conspiracy to violate, any law or regulation
relating to the illicit possession of or traffic in narcotic drugs
or marihuana, or who has been convic~d of a violation of, or a
conspiracy to violate, any law or regulation governing or controlling the taxing, manufacture, production, compounding,
transportation, sale, exchange, dispensing, giving away, importation, exportation, or the possession for the purpose of the
manufacture, production, compounding, transportation, sale,
exchange, dispensing, giving away, importation, or exportation
of opium, coca leaves, heroin, marihuana, any salt derivative
or preparation of opium or coca leaves or isonipecaine or any
addiction-forming or addiction-sustaining opiate . .
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conflict with the Second and Tenth Circuits,5 and ignores the
·1976 decision of Matter of Silva 8 in which the Board of Immigration Appeals acquiesced in the Second Circuit's position and allowed such relief on a nationwide basis.
I.

BACKGROUND

Drug offenders are in extreme disfavor under the immigration laws. Section 212(a)(23) of the Act provides for the exclusion
from admission into the United States of any alien who has been
convicted of a narcotic drug or marijuana offense, 7 while section
241(a)(11) of the Act provides for the deportation of any alien,
including a lawful permanent resident alien, who has been convicted of a narcotic drug or marijuana offense. s Congress did,
however, explicitly provide for the discretionary waiver of the
drug-related ground for exclusion under section 212(c) of the Act,9
if an alien: (1) was lawfully admitted for permanent residence
previously, (2) had temporarily proceeded abroad voluntarily,
and (3) was returning to a lawful unrelinquished domicile of seven
consecutive years. Therefore, by its specific language, section
212(c) appears to apply only when a resident alien attempts to
return after a temporary absence. However, the Board of Immigration Appeals has never interpreted the waiver provision so
narrowly. In numerous cases, the Board has allowed a section
212(c) waiver of a ground of inadmissibility nunc pro tunc in
deportation proceedings where an alien, after conviction, departed and was subjected to deportation charges after returning. to
The reliance of both of these decisions on Arias-Uribe v. Immigration & Nat. Serv.,
466 F.2d 1198 (9th Cir. 1972), leaves open the question of whether an application for relief
under § 212(c) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1976), filed in conjunction with an adjustment of status application under § 245 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (1976), is acceptable.
In Arias-Uribe, the court pointed out in a footnote that this question was left unanswered.
466 F.2d at 1199 n.3. Presumably, if a lawful permanent alien is deportable for a drug
offense and is otherwise eligible for adjustment of status, an application for a waiver under
§ 212(c) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1976), is not foreclosed. See also Matter of Smith,
11 I. & N. Dec. 325 (1965).
5. Vissian v. Immigration & Nat. Serv., 548 F.2d 325 (lOth Cir. 1977); Francis v.
Immigration & Nat. Serv., 532 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1976). Since the Immigration & Naturalization Service did not contest the availability of relief to an alien narcotics offender in
Byus-Narvaez v. Immigration & Nat. Serv., 601 F.2d 879 (5th Cir. 1979), such relief
remains available in the Fifth Circuit as well.
6. Interim Decision 2532 (B.I.A. Sept. 10, 1976).
7. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(23) (1976).
8. For the relevant statutory language of section 241(a)(11) of the Act, see note 4

supra.
9. For the relevant statutory language of section 212(c) of the Act, see note 1 supra.
10. See, e.g., Matter of Tanori, Interim Decision 2467 (B.I.A. Feb. 4, 1976) (deportahttp://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol10/iss1/5
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Under the waiver provision, the requirement that an alien
must have "temporarily proceeded abroad" created a curious sit. uation. A seven-year lawful permanent resident alien convicted
of possession of marijuana could obtain relief if s/he happened to
take a vacation abroad after the conviction, while a similar alien
who had not left the country would not be eligible to apply.1I As
incongruous as this result might appear, the "temporarily proceeded abroad" requirement had been traditionally upheld. 12

In Francis v. Immigration & Naturalization Service,13 the
Second Circuit recognized the unfairness of such a result and
struck down the departure requirement as violative of equal protection. 14 In Matter of Silva, 15 the Board of Immigration Appeals
adopted Francis on a nationwide basis and stated:
We conclude that, under the provisions of section
212(c) of the Act, a waiver of the ground of inadmissibility may be granted to a permanent resident alien in a deportation proceeding regardless
of whether he departs the United States following
the act or acts which render him deportable. In
light of the constitutional requirements of due
process and equal protection of the law, it is our
position that no distinction shall be made between permanent resident aliens who temporarily
proceed abroad and non-departing permanent resident aliens. IS

In Francis, the alien had been convicted of possession of
tion charges based on conviction of possession of marijuana for sale); Matter of G-A-,
7 I. & N. Dec. 274 (1956) (deportation charges based on conviction of importation of
marijuana); Matter of S-, 6 I. & N. Dec. 392 (1954) (deportation charges based on four
petty theft convictions).
11. The situation is best illustrated in Matter of Tanori, Interim Decision 2467
(B.I.A. Feb. 4, 1976), where the alien had been convicted of possession of marijuana for
sale just over seven years from the date of his original entry. On the day of his conviction,
he went to visit a relative in Mexico and returned about 24 hours later. The Board of
Immigration Appeals held that the alien was eligible to apply for section 212(c) waiver
relief because he had met the "temporarily proceeded abroad" requirement. [d. at 2-3.
12. See, e.g., Matter of Arias-Uribe, 13 I. & N. Dec. 696 (1971), where the Board of
Immigration Appeals held that the "requirement that an alien must have 'temporarily
proceeded abroad voluntarily and not under an order of deportation' makes it clear that
. . . we have no basis for avoiding the statutory requirement. . .. " [d. at 700.
13. 532 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1976).
14. [d. at 273. Accord, Vissian v. Immigration & Nat. Serv., 548 F.2d 325 (lOth Cir.
1977).
15. Interim Decision 2532 (B.I.A. Sept. 10, 1976).
16. [d. at 7.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1980

3

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 1 [1980], Art. 5

4

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 10:1

marijuana. Similarly, the responden,t in Silva was found guilty of
possession of marijuana with the intent to distribute. Both aliens
were therefore drug offenders and deportable under section
241(a)(11) of the Act. However, in determining whether waiver
relief under section 212(c) of the Act was available, neither the
Second Circuit nor the Board of Immigration Appeals was troubled with the fact that the alien had been convicted of an offense
involving marijuana. IT The plain statutory language left no question that narcotics offenders were eligible for relief under the
waiver provision. ls Rather, the concern was with the "temporarily
proceeded abroad" requirement, which has nothing to do with the
offense involved and which was eventually resolved in the aliens'
favor in both cases. I. But for these decisions, even long-time permanent residents of the United States convicted of the most
minor drug offense would have no relief from deportation available to them if they had made no departure subsequent to conviction. 20
17. 532 F.2d at 270-72; Interim Decision 2532 at 3.
18. For the relevant statutory language of section 212(c) of the Act, see note 1 supra.
Since the language explicitly extends the waiver possibility to aliens excludable under
section 212(a) (23) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(23) (1976) (narcotics offenders), it is clear
that Congress intended to make this relief available to narcotics offende~s.
19. 532 F.2d at 272-73; Interim Decision 2532 at 7.
20. The Francis and Silua decisions were a result of a direct recognition of the plight
faced by longtime lawful permanent resident aliens who were, years after initially immigrating, convicted of a narcotics or marijuana offense. Prior to those decisions, it was
understood that no § 212(c) relief was available to such aliens unless the "temporarily
proceeded abroad" requirement had been met. There were innumberable sympathetic
examples of the hardships that resulted. Most often the cases involved resident aliens who
had entered as juveniles and who, fifteen or twenty years later, were convicted of simple
possession of marijuana. Generally, there was simply no relief from deportation available
to such individuals. Most had not met the "temporarily proceeded abroad" requirement
of § 212(c) of the Act. Also, suspension of deportation under § 244(a)(2) of the Act, 8
U .S.C. § 1254 (a)(2) (1976), is, for aU practical purposes, not available. This is because
§ 244(a)(2) requires a showing of good moral character for ten years subsequent to the
crime, but deportation authorities are not likely to wait ten years before instituting proceedings. AdditionaUy, aU arguments that deportation of aliens for simple possession of
marijuana constitutes a cruel and unusual punishment have failed. See, e.g., Lieggi v.
Immigration & Nat. Serv., 389 F. Supp. 12 (N.D. Ill. 1975), reu'd without published
opinion, 529 F.2d 530 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 939 (1976).
Thus, the Board of Immigration Appeal's adoption of Francis. in the Silua decision
was a large step in aUeviating the harsh result of deportation in sympathetic cases. See
also Matter of Marin, Interim Decision 2666 (B.I.A. Aug. 4, 1976).
The Immigration and Naturalization Service itself took administrative steps to aUeviate such harsh results in some cases. On April 21, 1977, it adopted § 241.1(a)(28) into
the Operating Instructions of the Immigration and Naturalization Service which provides:
Unless prior approval has been received from the regional commissioner, no order to show cause shall be issued in the case of
an alien who is a lawful permanent resident of the United
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II.

THE Nicholas AND
ISSUES PRESENTED

Bowe

5

OPINIONS: FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND

In Nicholas v. Immigration & Naturalization Service,21 the
alien, who had last entered the United States in 1967,22 was found
deportable on two grounds. Because of a 1975 conviction for conspiracy to possess a controlled substance with the intent to distribute, he was deportable under section 241(a)(11) of the Act as
a narcotics offender. He was also deportable under section
241(a)(1) of the Act as an alien who was excludable at the time
of entry. Apparently he had been previously deported and had not
been granted consent to apply for readmission in 1967 as required
by section 212(a)(17) of the Act. 23
On appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals, Nicholas
raised several points which do not appear to have been raised at
the deportation hearing. 24 He sought a discretionary waiver of
States and whose deportability is based on section 241(a)(11)
as one having been convicted of possession, importation or distribution of marijuana for no renumeration: Provided the
amount of marijuana involved does not exceed 100 grams: Provided further, that in the case of a conviction for distribution
without renumeration, the alien has been convicted of only one
such offense.
5 IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERVICE, OPERATIONS, INSTRUCTIONS, REGULATIONS AND
INTERPRETATION 2852.5 (rev. ed. 1952) partially codified as 8 C.F.R. § 242.1(a)(1979).
21. 590 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1979). Most of the Nicholas opinion dealt with the standards for review of a decision of the district director (the chief administrator of the local
immigration office) denying the alien's application for nonpriority (deferred) status.
Under such a status, the alien's deportation would be deferred indefinitely. This portion
of the court's opinion is significant in that it is the First Circuit court decision which
discusses the standards for reviewing district director decisions on non priority status
applications.ld. at 805-08. See also Lennon v. Immigration & Nat. Serv., 527 F.2d 187
(2d Cir. 1975).
22. The facts, as set forth in the opinion, do not state the precise status upon which
Nicholas entered the United States in 1967. But because he had never been "lawfully
admitted for permanent resident status," it can be inferred that he either entered illegally
or as a nonimmigrant.
23. Section 212(a)(17) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(17) (1976), provides:
Except as otherwise provided . . . the following classes of aliens shaH be ineligible to receive visas and shall be excluded
from admission . . . (17) Aliens who have been arrested and
deported . . . unless prior to their embarcation or reembarcation at a place outside the United States or their attempt to be
admitted . . . the Attorney General has consented to their
applying or reapplying for admission . . . .
24. The opinion indicates that the only relief sought by Nicholas at his deportation
hearing was nunc pr{J tunc permission to reapply for admission after deportation. The
immigration judge denied the requested reapplication. 590 F.2d at 804.
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deportability under section 212(c) of the Act and a remand to
show eligibility for non-priority status and to apply for political
asylum. The Board dismissed the appeal and Nicholas petitioned
for review in the Ninth Circuit. However, the Ninth Circuit denied his claim to non priority status25 and held that relief under
section 212(c) of the Act was unavailable.
In support of his request for relief under section 212(c) of the
Act, Nicholas contended that even though he had not been
"lawfully admitted for permanent resident status," as required
by the statute,28 to deny him such relief would constitute a denial
of equal protection. However, the court felt that it did not have
to reach the equal protection argument, and shocked observers by
stating that "[r]elief under section 212(c) has been held in this
circuit to be unavailable to an alien facing deportation for conviction of a drug-related crime, pursuant to [section 214(a)(11) of
the Act]. "27 The court reasoned that since this was one ofthe two
grounds of deportability, Nicholas would be ineligible for relief
under section 212(c) of the Act "even in the event he was granted
permanent resident status."28 The court cited two cases to support the proposition that the waiver relief of section 212(c) was
unavailable to narcotics offenders: Arias-Uribe v. Immigration &
Naturalization Service, 28 and Dunn v. Immigration & Naturalization Service. 30
In Bowe v. Immigration & Naturalization Service,31 section
241(a)(11) of the Act was the sole ground for deportation. Bowe
had entered the United States as a lawful permanent resident at
the age of sixteen in 1966, but in 1976 he was convicted of smuggling cocaine. At his deportation hearing, Bowe admitted deportability but applied for discretionary waiver relief under section
212(c) of the Act. The immigration judge denied the waiver and
Bowe appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals. He contended that the immigration judge had failed to afford him a full
and fair hearing on the application for section 212(c) waiver by
not allowing him to present certain evidence. However, the Board
25. See
26. For
27. 590
28.Id.
29. 466
30. 499
31. 597

note 20 supra and accompanying text.
the relevant statutory language of § 212(c) of the Act, see note 1 supra.
F.2d at 808.
F.2d 1198 (9th Cir. 1972).
F.2d 856 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1106 (1974).
F.2d 1158 (9th Cir. 1979).
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affirmed the decision of the immigration judge and Bowe sought
review in the Ninth Circuit. 32
In its original decision issued on February 7, 1979, a unanimous Ninth Circuit panel remanded the matter, agreeing that
Bowe had been denied a fair hearing. But the court, thereafter,
recalled its mandate and issued the revised opinion on April 23,
1979. In a two-to-one decision, the majority relied on the Nicholas
opinion which had been issued on February 2, 1979, for the proposition that relief under section 212(c) of the Act was unavailable
to narcotics offenders. 33 In addition to Nicholas, the Bowe majority cited only Dunn and Arias-Uribe. 34

m.

ANALYSIS

The Nicholas decision relied on merely two cases for the
premise that waiver relief under section 212(c) of the Act is unavailable to narcotics offenders deportable under section
241(a)(11) of the Act. The Bowe case in turn relied on Nicholas. 35
Thus if the reasoning in Nicholas fails, so must that in Bowe. An
examination of Arias-Uribe v. Immigration & Naturalization
Service 38 and Dunn v. Immigration & Naturalization Service 37
reveals that those cases do not stand for the principle which the
panel in Nicholas (and thus the panel in Bowe) ascribes to them.
Arias-Uribe involved a lawful permanent resident alien who
had been convicted of possession of heroin. Deportability was
charged under section 241(a)(11) of the Act, and waiver relief
under section 212(c) was sought at the deportation hearing. 3s The
deportation proceedings and subsequent review by the Board of
Immigration Appeals took place prior to the Second Circuit decision in Francis v. Immigration & Naturalization Service 39 and the
Board's new policy opinion in Matter of Silva. 40 Arias-Uribe
therefore faced a strict reading of section 212(c)-especially the
requirement that he must have "temporarily proceeded abroad"
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

[d. at 1159-60.
[d. at 1158.
[d.
[d.
466 F.2d 1198 (9th Cir. 1972).
499 F.2d 856 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1106 (1974).
466 F.2d at 1199.
532 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1976).
Interim Decision 2532 (B.I.A. Sept. 10, 1976).

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1980

7

8

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 1 [1980], Art. 5

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 10:1

subsequent to his conviction}! Since Arias-Uribe had never done
so, the Board of Immigration Appeals found that section 212(c)
relief was unavailable, affirmed the order of deportation and dismissed the appeal}2
On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the court affirmed the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals. 43 In so doing, the court
in Arias-Uribe did not purport to deviate from the Board's reasoning. Thus the Ninth Circuit held relief under section 212(c) of the
Act unavailable not because Arias-Uribe had been convicted of
possession of heroin, but because he had not "temporarily proceeded abroad" as required by the language of the waiver provision. 44 In discussing cases relied upon by Arias-Uribe's counsel,
the court did not distinguish cases involving narcotics convictions
from cases involving non-narcotics convictions}5 Instead, the
court was most concerned with the point that "[e]ach of them
involved an alien who was excludable at the time he last entered
the United States."48 Thus, what was significant to the court was
that Arias-Uribe had not departed and reentered subsequent to
conviction. The court spoke of the disfavor in which the Immigration and Nationality Act holds narcotics offenders; however, at
no point did the court attempt to go beyond the provisions of the
Act to develop additional sanctions against narcotics offenders. 47
The language of section 212(c) of the Act explicitly covers narcotics offenders. 48 The court did not overturn an administrative decision cited by the appellant in which such waiver relief had been
granted to a narcotics offender. 4u Thus Arias-Uribe cannot be
41. For the relevant statutory language of § 212(c) of the Act, see note 1 supra.
42. Matter of Arias-Uribe, 13 I. & N. Dec. 696 (1971).
43. 466 F.2d at 1200.
44. [d.
45. [d. at 1199, citinp Matter of Eng. 121. & N. Dec. 855 (1968) (possession of heroin);
Matter of Smith, 111. & N. Dec. 325 (1965) (disorderly conduct); Matter of G-A-, 71.
& N. Dec. 274 (1956) (importation of marijuana); Matter of S-, 61. & N. Dec. 393 (1954)
(petty larceny).
46. 466 F.2d at 1199.
47. [d.
48. See note 18 supra.
49. 466 F.2d at 1199. Matter of G-A-, 7 I. & N. Dec. 274 (1956) (convicted of
importation of marijuana).
The Arias-Uribe decision could be read for the proposition that the only time a drug
offender is eligible for relief under § 212(c) of the Act is when the grounds for exclusion
under 212(a) (23) of the Act are being charged by the government. This would require that
the person be the subject of an exclusion proceeding or of a deportation proceeding under
§ 241 (a)(1) of the Act, where the alien was excludable at the time of entry before the relief
of § 212(c) would be available. Under such an interpretation, the immigration authorities
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cited for the proposition that the Nicholas and Bowe panels ascribe to it, that is, that narcotics offenders are per se ineligible
for relief under section 212(c) of the Act. Rather, it is merely
another pre-Francis and Silva decision which mandated strict
adherence to the "temporarily proceeded abroad" requirement.
Dunn v. Immigration & Naturalization Service 50 adds nothing to the court's reasoning in Nicholas and Bowe. Ten years after
his admission as a permanent resident, Dunn was cOIivicted of
possession of marijuana. Deportation proceedings were instituted
against him under section 241(a)(11) of the Act and he sought
waiver relief under section 212(c) even though he had never left
the United States since his original entry. 51 The controlling issue
for the court in Dunn was again the fact that the "temporarily
proceeded abroad" requirement of section 212(c) had not been
met.
Petitioner urges that he should be eligible for discretionary relief from deportation under
§ 212(c) of the Act . . . even though he is not
technically "returning to the United States after
a voluntary departure." In effect Petitioner is requesting advance permission to return to an unrelinquished domicile, despite the fact that otherwise he would be ineligible for admittance under
section 212(a)(23) ... as an "alien who has been
convicted of a violation of. . . any law or regulation relating to the illicit possession of or traffic in
narcotic drugs or marihuana."
As petitioner recognizes in his brief, this precise contention was rejected by this court in AriasUribe v. INS . . . . 52

The court in Dunn did not hold that narcotics offenders are
per se ineligible for relief under section 212(c) of the Act; rather,
it was concerned that Dunn was not returning after a voluntary
could thwart § 212(c) relief to such an alien by charging deportability under § 241 (a)(11)
of the Act instead. This interpretation of the law was expressly rejected in Matter of
G-A-, 7 I. & N. Dec. 274 (1956). It is clear that such a result would render § 212(c) of
the Act totally meaningless whenever a corresponding ground for deportation (§ 241(a)(I))
existed for a ground of exclusion (§ 241(a)(11)).
50. 499 F.2d 856 (9th Cir.), cert. denied. 419 U.S. 1106 (1974).
51. [d. at 857.
52. [d. (footnote omitted).
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departure. 53 The court's reliance on Arias-Uribe was only for that
limited principle as well, and the case was not cited for the unsupported notion that section 212(c) relief is not available to any
narcotics offenders.
The Ninth Circuit decisions in Arias-Uribe and Dunn do not,
therefore, support the conclusions which the panels in Nicholas
and Bowe appear to have reached, namely that all narcotics offenders are ineligible for relief under section 212(c) of the Act.
The key point in Arias-Uribe and Dunn was that the alien had
made no departure subsequent to conviction and therefore did
not meet the "temporarily proceeded abroad" requirement. The
fact that both cases involved narcotics offenders is coincidental.
A long-time permanent resident alien deportable for another
criminal offense prior to Silva 54 would have also been denied section 212(c) waiver relief if the "temporarily proceeded abroad"
requirement subsequent to conviction had not been met. 55
The decisions in Nicholas and Bowe are troubling in other
respects. Neither panel dealt with Silva 58 which was decided subsequent to Arias-Uribe and Dunn, in which the Board of Immigration Appeals acquiesced in the Second Circuit's opinion of
Francis v. Immigration & Naturalization Service 57 on a nationwide basis. As a result, after Nicholas and Bowe, relief under
section 212(c) of the Act is available to narcotics offenders everywhere except in the Ninth Circuit. 58 Additionally, on appeal the
government had not contended in either Nicholas or Bowe that
relief under section 212(c) of the Act was unavailable to lawful
permanent resident aliens convicted of narcotics offenses. 59 The
53.ld.
54. Interim Decision 2532 (B.I.A. Sept. 10, 1976).
55. See, e.g., Munoz-Casarez v. Immigration & Nat. Serv., 511 F.2d 947 (9th Cir.
1975).
56. Interim Decision 2532 (B.I.A. Sept. 10, 1976).
57. 532 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1976).
58. The situation is well illustrated in the position taken by the Board of Immigration
Appeals in a recent unreported case decided on August 2,1979. Matter of Monge-Miranda,
Immigration File No. All 435534 (B.I.A. Aug. 2, 1979). The per curiam decision stated:
The decision of the immigration judge is affirmed. A waiver of
excludability under 212(c) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(c), for a
charge based on section 241(a)(11) of the Act, is not available
in the Ninth Circuit. See Bowe v. INS . .. ; Nicholas v. INS
. . . . Accordingly, the decision of the immigration judge was
correct and is affirmed.
59. 597 F.2d at 1159 (Bright, J., dissenting). See also Byus-Narvaez v. Immigration
& Nat. Serv., 601 F.2d 879 (5th Cir. 1979); note 5 supra.
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facts in Nicholas indicate that the alien was not even a lawful
permanent resident. Since the language of section 212(c) of the
Act expressly requires lawful admission for permanent residence,
relief would have more appropriately been denied on the grounds
that there had been a failure to meet that requirement. Similarly,
by following Nicholas blindly without analysis, the Ninth Circuit,
in Bowe, compounded the error.

IV.

CONCLUSION

The proposition announced in Nicholas v. Immigration &
Naturalization Service and Bowe v. Immigration & Naturalization Service that relief under section 212(c) of the Act is unavailable to any alien narcotics offender deportable under section
241(a)(11) of the' Act, was advanced without proper authority.60
The decisions ignored the direct conflict created not only with
cases in two other circuits, but with an administrative decision
which had more generously made relief available to alien narcotics offenders. By destroying the possibility of section 212(c) relief
to narcotics offenders in deportation proceedings in this circuit,
60. On February 19, 1980, in support of a motion to reopen directed to the Board of
Immigration Appeals by the alien Bowe, the Immigration and Naturalization Service
surprisingly urged the Board to ignore the Nicholas and Bowe decisions even in the Ninth
Circuit. The Service's position was that relief under § 212(c) should be administered
uniformly throughout the country under the Silva decision, and that Nicholas and Bowe
were decided incorrectly insofar as they hold that § 212(c) relief is unavailable to narcotic
violators per se. To date the Board has not ruled on Bowe's motion. Memorandum from
Deputy General Counsel Paul W. Schmidt, INS, to Chairman David L. Milhollan, BIA
(Feb. 19, 1980). In the recent case of Castillo-Felix v. Immigration & Nat. Serv., 601 F.2d
459 (9th Cir. 1979), the Ninth Circuit appears to have limited the Nicholas case to a mere
reinforcement of the "temporarily proceeded abroad" requirement of § 212(c), as opposed
to a broader reading which would prohibit such relief in any narcotics cases. In a footnote
to its opinion, the court stated:
Consequently, we need not resolve an apparent conflict
between this circuit and the Second Circuit. In Francis v. INS
. . . , the Second Circuit ruled that the nunc pro tunc extension
of [§ 212(c)] . . . violated equal protection. The court held
that it was irrational to extend [§ 212(c)] relief to deportees
who had fortuitously departed after committing a deportable
offense, but deny it to deportees who had not. The INS acquiesced in the Francis ruling and no longer requires actual
departure by deportees requesting [§ 212(c) 1relief. Matter of

Silva . ...
This circuit, however, continues to recognize the actual
departure requirement. Arias-Uribe v. INS ... followed in
Nicholas v. INS . . . Dunn v. INS . . . . Under this line of
cases, petitioner would fail to qualify for [§ 212(c)] relief because he did not depart the country after committing the offense for which he is being deported.
Id. at 462 n.6.
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the Ninth Circuit has thereby retarded the efforts of the Board
of Immigration Appeals to more liberally interpret the immigration laws in favor of such offenders, and has created a serious
inconsistency in the application of the immigration laws between
this circuit and all others. The results are unsettling and implore·
clarification and a more reasoned resolution by the Ninth Circuit.
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